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Abstract – The recent passing of the Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act of 2015 introduces a new 
framework for information sharing between private and 
US government entities with the expressed intent to 
identify cybersecurity threats. This is the latest in a series 
of similar bills that have been introduced to Congress 
over the last several years. While each of the previous 
standalone bills were defeated following widespread 
public resistance, the latest edition was included as an 
amendment to the United States’ 2016 spending bill. This 
means that any dissenting congressmen unwilling to pass 
the spending bill with the CISA rider would be willing to 
risk another government shutdown due to the inability to 
come to terms on the budget measures. This paper seeks 
to explore the potential impacts of the measures 
introduced or enabled by CISA, and consider the 
formalization of digital privacy rights in an increasingly 
online and monitored world. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 
(CISA) [1] was enacted on December 18, 2015 as an 
amendment to the US government’s 2016 omnibus 
spending bill [2, 3]. CISA introduces a new framework 
enabling automated dissemination of perceived 
cybersecurity threats between private and federal entities. 
Similar standalone bills (Stop Online Piracy Act [4], 
Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act [5], and 
CISA [1]) were proposed to congress in recent years with 
mixed success; each was eventually stricken down by 
opposition to the wide scope, vague language, and recent 
revelations of systemic government surveillance [6]. By 
including the latest iteration of CISA as a rider to the 
omnibus spending bill, any congressman compelled to 
vote against the information sharing act would need to 
vote against the spending bill as a whole. Failure to pass 
the spending bill would risk a government shutdown like 
the one experienced in 2013 [7], a measure some 
congressmen opposing CISA may not have been 
willing to make. 
 
CISA defines a framework for sharing information 
about perceived cybersecurity threats between internet 
companies and government entities [8]. Now that CISA 
is officially a law in the United States, what 
developments can we expect to see in internet-based 
service providers? What sort of information will 
internet companies be sharing with the government? 
Who will have access to this information? The paper 
seeks to answer those questions and explore the use of 
personally identifiable information (PII) in the system 
enabled by CISA. 
 
 
II. CISA’S PROVISIONS 
 
The information sharing framework outlined by CISA 
enables government and private entities to share data 
with each other with the expressed intent of identifying 
and subverting cybersecurity threats [2, 3]. The act does 
not require companies to share information, but rather 
puts in place a system to make sharing possible. 
 
Under this act companies monitoring their traffic 
would, upon identifying a potential cyber threat, 
automatically forward the traffic information to a 
system managed by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), which would then in turn share the 
information directly with other government entities [9], 
such as the National Security Agency (NSA) or Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). In previous iterations of 
CISA the DHS was required to vet the received traffic 
by scrubbing any PII, but it remains unclear what entity 
would be responsible for ensuring that PII is removed 
from the collected data [10]. Furthermore since the sort 
of PII will vary depending on the traffic, it is unclear to 
what extent PII will be removed. CISA states that 
shared information shall not identify an individual, and 
that only traffic directly related to a cybersecurity threat 
will be shared, but how either of those thresholds is 
determined is undefined. 
 
CISA also allows companies to share data without the risk 
of liability [2]. This could remove some companies’ 
obligation to protect their users, which could conceivably 
lead users to find alternative service providers. 
 
 
III. RISK OF INFORMATION SHARING 
 
As with previously proposed online traffic sharing laws 
(i.e. SOPA, CISPA), CISA has generated controversy 
from internet companies and privacy advocates alike [11-
13]. Even if the groups implementing CISA manage an 
infallible implementation, the privacy advocates contend 
that an internet user has the right to privacy, and that the 
government has no right to collect and study a user’s 
traffic [14]. The picture is further muddied by the 
question of who owns the content a user uploads any 
social media or other website [15].  
 
Furthermore, revelations in recent years have revealed 
that the US has been involved with several schemes that 
attempt to subvert a user’s online privacy. From bulk 
collection of phone records [16], to bulk collection of 
internet traffic [17, 18], to attacking common online 
encryption methods [19, 20], the US has proven that it is 
interested in analyzing as much internet traffic as 
possible. Even if its goal is truthfully an attempt to 
“protect… an information system from a cybersecurity 
threat”, as stated in the CISA text, its previous attempts to 
undermine encryption standards leave it in an 
untrustworthy position to manage bulk traffic data. 
 
 
IV. RIGHT TO DIGITAL PRIVACY 
 
The revelations of the US government’s pervasive 
surveillance raise questions about how several of a US 
citizen’s constitutional rights, including the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments [21-24], are protected 
in a world with so much personal information available 
online [25]. The application of the Fourth Amendment, 
which protects a citizen’s rights against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, appears to be the most relevant 
with the enactment of CISA. 
 
The concept of the Fourth Amendment requires that a law 
enforcement agency gathers enough evidence against a 
person to obtain a warrant before ever attempting to 
search or seize a person’s property [22]. Without probably 
cause, the agency should not be able to obtain permission 
to search the person’s property. But how does this apply 
to digital communications that are stored by a phone 
company or an internet service provider? While earlier 
Supreme Court decisions established a person’s right to 
privacy while engaging in a telephone conversation 
[26], the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 (ECPA) and the PATRIOT Act of 2001 together 
allow federal agencies to search telephone, e-mail, 
financial, and other records without requiring a warrant 
[27, 28]. Plenty have argued that these laws are 
unconstitutional and a violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights [29]; in fact the US government allowed the 
provisions enabling bulk collection of phone records to 
expire just this year [30]. Considering the ECPA’s and 
PATRIOT Act’s questionable usage, the recent 
revelations of the NSA’s subversive actions, and the 
today’s increasingly mobile and internet-enabled 
technologies, several groups have begun advocating for 
new digital privacy rights to protect the growing 
amount of user data [31].  
 
One proposal is the introduction of new legislation to 
modify the ECPA in order to guarantee a user’s right to 
protect their digital information under the Fourth 
Amendment [31]. Such a law would ensure that user 
information, including PII, would be protected from all 
analysis unless the agency is able to show probably 
cause and obtain a warrant. Protecting digital user 
information under the Fourth Amendment would 
certainly go against the system put forth in the CISA 
act, meaning the recently enacted legislation would 
need to be overhauled, if not repealed, to conform to 
the proposed digital privacy standards. Modifications to 
the CISA legislation could be enacted to share 
anonymous traffic patterns could still be leveraged to 
identify cybersecurity threats. Threat patterns revealed 
through traffic such as bot net activities would still be 
readily identifiable from the aggregate picture, and 
without violating sensitive user data. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The recently passed CISA law, included in the US 
government’s 2016 omnibus spending bill, enables a 
framework for sharing information between private 
companies and US government entities. Questions 
remain about how CISA will work in practice, since it 
is unclear how PII will be identified and removed, and 
by whom. Though CISA’s advertised intent is to 
identify and stop cybersecurity threats, the 
government’s history shows that it has an interest in 
maintaining an ability to access as much data transiting 
the internet as it can. The current laws regarding 
analysis of stored electronic communications appear to 
already be quite favorable to the government, and 
arguably violating the Fourth Amendment. By enacting 
legislation to cover a person’s electronic information 
under the Fourth Amendment the United States could 
conceivably guarantee that person’s right to digital 
privacy while maintaining the ability to detect 
cybersecurity threats. 
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